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STATEMENT OF ISSUES 
The following represents the only issue pertaining 
to Respondent, Lydia J. Torgerson on appeal: 
Did the Industrial Commission abuse its discretion 
in construing two incidents as a single accident. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Respondent, Lydia J. Torgerson, hereinafter "Ms. Torgerson" 
agrees with the initial portion of the Statement Of The Case of 
Appellant, Utah State Insurance Fund, but submits the following 
Statement of Facts for review. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Ms. Torgerson began her employment with Richfield Care 
Center in July of 1979. Her duties included dressing patients 
and getting them ready for their daily routine. Many patients 
are totally helpless and must be physically assisted in normal 
daily activities (R. 21-22). 
On July 6, 1980, while assisting a patient to a chair, 
the patient threw himself towards the chair, throwing Ms. Torgerson 
against the wall and onto the floor. Ms. Torgerson felt immediate 
pain in the lower back (R. 65). Ms. Torgerson immediately reported 
the incident to her employer and received some benefits (R. 3-5) . 
Ms. Torgerson was treated by Dr. Allen and Dr. Henrie on July 10, 19 80, 
(R. 40 and 129) . She undertook physical therapy for six months 
(R. 70) and wore a back brace continuously thereafter until January 
of 1983 (R. 63). 
On January 20, 19 82, some seventeen and one-half months 
after the original accident, Ms. Torgerson was lifting a one hundred 
ninety pound patient with one arm and reached with the other arm to 
straighten his t-shirt and she felt a sudden terrific pain in the 
lower back (R. 23 and 50). Ms. Torgerson immediately reported the 
incident to her employer and sought medical attention the same day 
(R. 24-25). Ms. Torgerson received conservative treatment for the 
next several months and finally surgery in September, 19 82, for a 
herniated disk. 
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Ms. Torgerson filed an application for benefits with 
the Commission for the January 20, 1982, incident (R. 12); the 
State Insurance denied liability and moved to join the Second Injury 
Fund because of the prior incident (R. 14). The hearing on the 
matter was held on April 25, 1983, with the State Insurance Fund 
and Second Injury Fund appearing by counsel (R. 16). A full hearing 
was held with the Defendants cross examining Ms, Torgerson and 
examining all commission and medical records on both the 19 80 and 
1982 incidents. 
On May 4, 19 83, the Administrative Law Judge entered 
Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Order providing, among 
other things, that: 
" . . . The 1980 incident was clearly an industrial 
accident, but no claim is made by the applicant 
for that incident. The only event for which a claim 
is being made is for an incident that occurred on 
January 20, 19 82." 
The Administrative Law Judge thereafter found that the January 20, 
1982, incident, in and of itself, did not constitute an accident and 
benefits were denied (R. 135) . 
On May 10, 19 83, Ms. Torgerson filed a Petition for 
Reconsideration and Supplemental Order to permit the application to be 
amended to request a claim for benefits for both the 1980 and 1982 
incidents (R. 142-145). 
On February 21, 198 4, the Administrative Law Judge granted 
Ms. Torgersonfs petition, vacated the Order of May 4, 19 83, and 
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referred the matter to a Medical Panel for evaluation (R. 152) . 
The Medical Panel found: 
"As far as the herniated disk at L4-5 is concerned, 
it is the opinion of the Panel that this is related 
to the industrial accident. It is our opinion that 
this began with the injury of 1978, was aggravated 
by the injury of 1980, and was further aggravated 
and required surgery following the injury of 1982." 
(R. 167). 
The Panel also found that the "industrial accident of 
January 20, 1982" caused a herniated disk which was degenerated due 
to the prior back injuries (R. 174); permanent physical impairment 
of 7 1/2% was attributed 2 1/2% to preexisting conditions, 2 1/2% 
to the July 6, 1980 accident and 2 1/2% to the January 20, 1982, 
accident (R. 166). 
There being no objections to the Medical Panel reports, 
the Administrative Law Judge received the same in evidence, adopted 
the findings as his own and awarded benefits to Ms. Torgerson 
accordingly (R. 175-179). The Motion for Review by Defendant, 
State Insurance Fund (R. 181) was denied (R. 186) and the present 
Petition for Review filed (R. 188). 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
Respondent, Lydia J. Torgerson argues that the Industrial 
Commission did not act arbitrarily or capriously in finding that two 
incidents, the first on July 6, 1980, and the second on January 20, 
19 82, combined to constitute a compensable "accident" under the ACT. 
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ARGUMENT 
THE INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION DID NOT ABUSE ITS DISCRETION 
IN CONSTRUING THE JULY 6, 1980, AND JANUARY 20, 1982, 
INCIDENTS AS A SINGLE "ACCIDENT" UNDER THE ACT. 
The question of whether an "accident" must consist of 
a single incident, occurring at a particular moment in time has 
previously been discussed by this Court in Carling v. Industrial 
Commission, 16 Utah 2d 260, 399 P.2d 202 (1965) and reaffirmed 
in Kaiser Steel Corporation v. Monfredi, Utah, 631 P.2d 888 (1981). 
Both cases acknowledge the doctrine that accidents may consist of 
numerous incidents which result in a "climax" due to exertion, 
stress or other repetitive causes in such manner as to constitute 
an accident. These are to be distinguished from gradually developing 
conditions classified as occupational diseases which do not constitute 
an accident. 
None of the parties to this appeal contest that the 
incident of July 6, 1980, standing on its own, constitutes an 
industrial accident for which Ms. Torgerson is entitled to compensation. 
The real issue is whether the subsequent incident, seventeen and one-
half months later, on January 20, 19 82, can be construed as the 
climax due to exertion, stress or repetitive causes or must it 
stand on its own as a new and different injury in order to be 
compensable. 
In the original findings, conclusion and order of May 4, 
1983, the Administrative Law Judge clearly felt compelled to consider 
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only the January 20, 1982, incident in determining whether an 
"accident" had occurred because Ms. Torgerson had not formally 
filed an application for the prior 1980 incident. The following 
language in the order illustrates this approach: 
"The 19 80 incident was clearly an industrial 
accident, but no claim is made by the applicant 
for that incident. The only event for which a 
claim is being made is for an incident that 
occurred on January 20, 19 82." 
The Administrative Law Judge thereafter reviewed the 
events of January 20, 1982, and concluded that that particular 
incident, when isolated, did not amount to an "accident" within 
the ACT. 
After Ms. Torgersonfs Petition for Reconsideration 
was granted and the application amended to allege both incidents, 
the Administrative Law Judge correctly removed the January 20, 1982, 
incident from its vacuum and evaluated the application in terms of 
both incidents as prescribed in the Carling and Monfredi decisions. 
In his Order of October 3, 19 84, the Administrative Law 
Judge correctly found that on the July 6, 1980, incident Ms. Torgerson 
was knocked against a wall and fell to the floor injuring her lower 
back and received conservative treatment at the local hospital. 
Therapy continued for six months. She remained employed with the 
Richfield Care Center, but was required to wear a back brace con-
tinuously to and beyong the January 20, 1982, incident. The short 
period of time between the incidents, the continued treatment 
during the interim, and employment required heavy lifting (raising 
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a one hundred ninety pound man with one arm for dressing) creates 
a nexus between the two incidents. This nexus supports a finding 
by the Administrative Law Judge that the January 20, 1982, incident 
was a "climax" to an accident beginning in July of 1980. 
The Medical Panel Reports adopted by the Administrative 
Law Judge as his findings, directly connect the causation of the 
herniated disk to both incidents: 
As far as the herniated disk at L4-5 is concerned, 
it is the opinion of the Panel that this is related 
to the industrial accident. It is our opinion that 
this began with the injury of 1978, was aggravated 
by the injury of 1980, and was further aggravated and 
required surgery following the injury of 1982. 
4. The percentage of permanent physical impairment 
attributable to the accident of July 6th, 19 80, is 
2 & 1/2 per cent of the whole body. The permanent 
impairment related to the accident of January 20th, 
1982, is 2 & 1/2 per cent of the whole body. 
CONCLUSION 
Weighing the evidence in light most favorable to the 
findings and order, Chadwick v. Industrial Commission, Utah, 57 2 
P.2d 400 (1977), the action by the Commission cannot be construed 
as arbitrary or capricious, or wholly without cause, or contrary 
to the one inevitable conclusion from the evidence or without 
any substantial evidence to support them. Sabo Electronic Service 
v. Sabo, Utah, 642 P.2d 722 (1982). The decision is also consistent 
with the principle that "the compensation statutes should be 
liberally construed in favor of recovery," McPhie v. Industrial 
Commission, UTAH, 567 P.2d 153 (1977). The order of the Industrial 
Commission should be affirmed. 
DATED this 7th day of May, 19 85. 
LABRUM & TAYLOR 
MICHAEL R. LABRUM 
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